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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.   
 Plaintiff Donald Parkell is a Delaware state prisoner 
who claims that state officials deprived him of his rights 
under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by 
subjecting him to unreasonable thrice-daily visual body-
cavity searches and harsh conditions and by depriving him of 
adequate medical care.  He seeks damages and injunctive 
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware granted summary judgment 
to the defendants, and Parkell timely appealed.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm in part and reverse in part.  
We will reverse only as to Parkell’s claim under the Fourth 
Amendment for prospective injunctive relief.1  
 
I.2 
 
 Parkell was an inmate at James T. Vaughn 
Correctional Center (“VCC”) in Smyrna, Delaware, during 
the relevant time period, which began on January 1, 2009, 
when Parkell slipped and fell at VCC and was injured.  He 
was transported to Kent General Hospital in Dover, 
Delaware, and examined.  His chest, spine, head, and right 
hand and wrist were x-rayed with normal results, except for 
loss of normal lumbar lordosis possibly due to muscular 
strain.  He was then discharged to the prison infirmary, where 
he was housed for approximately a week.  Parkell was placed 
under 24-hour supervision and prescribed pain medication 
and exercises.  He received this treatment through a small slot 
                                              
 1 Parkell’s attorneys are appearing pro bono.  We 
express our gratitude to those attorneys for accepting this 
matter pro bono and for the quality of their representation of 
their client.  Lawyers who act pro bono fulfill the highest 
service that members of the bar can offer to indigent parties 
and to the legal profession. 
 2 Much of Parkell’s version of events is supported 
solely by his own statements in verified complaints and other 
court filings.  Because those documents were signed under 
penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, we 
consider them as equivalent to statements in an affidavit.  See 
United States v. 225 Cartons, More or Less of an Article or 
Drug, 871 F.2d 409, 414 n.4 (3d Cir. 1989).  
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in the cell door, approximately three feet off the ground, and 
was told that medical staff were not permitted to enter his cell 
because of his high-security status as a resident of the 
Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”).  He complained of intense 
pain, but medical staff refused to treat his elbow because his 
chart did not mention an elbow injury.  Staff refused to give 
him ice for his injury, again citing his high-security status.  
His room was unheated, and he complained.  But prison 
officials told him that he would not be moved and had to 
endure the cold because of his SHU status; they did not 
provide any extra linens or clothing.  
 
 After his week in the infirmary, Parkell was returned 
to the SHU.  He submitted a request for “sick call” for his 
elbow, which was swollen, discolored, and painful.  On or 
about January 12, he was brought to Betty Bryant, a nurse 
employed at VCC.  According to Parkell, Bryant never truly 
examined the elbow and “would not allow [Parkell] to talk 
while in her presence” or to “describe his injury and 
symptoms.”  Appendix (“App.”) 96, 178.  She characterized 
his condition as mere “edema” (i.e., swelling) even though it 
was a “massive infection,” and accused Parkell of “run[ning] 
game” to get Vicodin, adding that she would not bother the 
doctor because he would not “fall for it” either.  Id.  She said 
that she would order an x-ray herself and that if Parkell 
needed aspirin he could buy it from the commissary.  She 
then told officers to “get him out of here.”  App. 96.  Bryant, 
on the other hand, claims in her affidavit that she examined 
his elbow, saw no sign of infection, advised him to avoid 
sleeping on his arm, and ordered follow-up x-rays.  She 
argues that that is corroborated by a January 12, 2009 
physician order implementing her own x-ray order, along 
with the x-ray reports, dated January 16, showing normal 
results.  Parkell’s elbow got worse “[o]ver the next few days,” 
and the wound ultimately opened and “squirted” pus.  App. 
96.  A doctor arrived to perform emergency surgery and 
prescribe antibiotics and pain medication.  Testing revealed 
that Parkell had had a staph infection.  When Parkell later 
complained about tingling and numbness, a doctor performed 
nerve testing and told Parkell that there might be “branching 
damage.”  App. 97.     
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 Several months later, on November 4, 2009, Parkell 
was moved to an isolation cell in a unit known as “C-
Building” because of disciplinary misconduct, where he 
remained for twelve days.  Parkell, like other inmates in 
isolation in C-Building, was locked in a stripped-down cell, 
was given only a t-shirt, boxer briefs, and socks to wear, was 
not permitted to keep rags, towels, or rolls of toilet paper in 
his cell, and was provided with soap and other hygienic items 
only during thrice-weekly showers.  Parkell was also denied 
exercise, never permitted to leave the cell except during the 
five-minute thrice-weekly showers, and required to eat meals 
in his cell without any opportunity to wash his hands first.  
Three times per day officers “strip searche[d]” him, visually 
inspecting his anus and genitals while he “was forced to squat 
naked and cough loudly.”  App. 99.  Parkell attests that he 
had “no contact with any other human beings” while in 
isolation, though he says that “[n]urses would arrive daily to 
pass out medication.”  App. 98-99.  When nurses arrived to 
pass out medication, Parkell showed them the infection, but 
they said it was against policy for medical staff to visit 
inmates in isolation.  His elbow again deteriorated and 
released pus.  
 
 There is some question as to precisely how long it took 
for Parkell to receive treatment for his elbow injury while in 
C-Building.  Parkell’s account provides little detail.  He 
claims that his elbow was not evaluated until “[a] few days” 
into his isolation period, when a mental health worker who 
visited him finally advocated for him.  App. 98, 180.  He was 
then taken to the infirmary and given antibiotics and pain 
medication, and nurses were ordered to clean the wound.  But 
“Interdisciplinary Progress Notes” dated November 5, 2009 
(Parkell’s second day in C-Building), which appear to be 
prepared by a nurse (although it is unclear who prepared 
them), note the swollen elbow and pus drainage and suggest 
that the nurse took a culture, cleaned and dressed the wound, 
and called the on-call doctor, who ordered medication.  App. 
959-60.  Records of physician orders suggest that the 
medication was to begin on November 5, 2009, although the 
order was not actually signed by the doctor until November 
10.  Further progress notes dated November 9 note that 
Parkell was “referred . . . to a provider” on November 6 but 
“[w]as never seen” and that “[t]he lab report[ed] never 
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receiving specimen.”  App. 962.  The preparer of those notes 
describes cleaning and dressing the wound, “reculturing” it, 
and “refer[ring] to provider again — tomorrow.”  Id.  The 
report of the culture result lists the collection date as 
November 9.  Records suggest that further treatment was 
ordered on November 10 and Parkell’s elbow was x-rayed on 
November 13.  Parkell agrees that his elbow was operated on 
a second time on December 4, 2009.  
 
 The final series of events concerns Parkell’s physical 
therapy for his elbow, which was ordered (presumably by his 
treating doctor, but the complaint is unclear) to begin in 
August 2009.  By March 2010, Parkell had received only 
three physical therapy sessions.  His therapist informed him 
that he had ligament damage, most likely requiring an MRI, 
and that the long delay between his injury and the start of 
therapy had caused him to heal incorrectly.  He was taken for 
an MRI around June 1, 2010, and then referred to an 
orthopedic specialist who recommended surgery.  Two 
months later, there had been no “progression in treatment,” so 
Parkell filed a grievance.  App. 196.  He was initially told in 
response to the grievance that there was no record of the 
surgery recommendation, but the recommendation was later 
uncovered.  The surgery was performed on March 9, 2011.  
He then spent two weeks in the infirmary, where he was 
denied any time outside his cell, even to shower, and required 
to receive medication and therapy through the small slot in 
the door, which caused Parkell pain.   
 
 On March 21, 2011, his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. 
DuShuttle, prescribed four Vicodin per day for pain, but upon 
his return to VCC, Parkell was given only two per day.  One 
day Parkell received only one pill, and on two occasions he 
received no pills for the day; he was told that there was a 
supply shortage.  During a follow-up visit on April 13, 2011, 
Dr. DuShuttle ordered more pain medication and physical 
therapy three times per week.  But Parkell received therapy 
only once per week, and even then only about two-thirds of 
the weeks.  
 
 Proceeding pro se, Parkell filed a lawsuit against 
Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (“CMS”) and Correct 
Care Services, LLC (“CCS”), which were contractors 
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providing medical care to the Delaware Department of 
Correction (“DOC”);3 Nurse Bryant in her individual 
capacity; Chris Damron (another nurse employed by CMS at 
VCC) in her individual capacity — these four will be referred 
to collectively as the “Medical Defendants” — DOC 
Commissioner Carl Danberg in his individual and official 
capacities; Warden Perry Phelps in his individual and official 
capacities; Deputy Warden David Pierce (a supervisor of 
security matters) in his individual and official capacities; 
Deputy Warden Christopher Klein (a supervisor of medical 
issues) in his individual and official capacities; Captain M. 
Rispoli (a shift commander) in his individual and official 
capacities; and Major Michael Costello (a supervisor of 
security matters) in his individual and official capacities — 
these defendants will be referred to collectively as the “State 
Defendants.”4  
 
 Parkell alleged that his Eighth Amendment rights were 
violated because he was provided inadequate healthcare and 
subjected to cruel conditions of confinement.  Commissioner 
Danberg was accused of renewing CMS’s contract with the 
DOC despite knowing of the inadequate care being provided, 
signing a contract with CCS without doing due diligence, and 
implementing policies and practices that denied adequate 
care.  The remaining DOC officials (Phelps, Pieces, Klein, 
Rispoli, and Costello), as well as CMS and CCS, were 
accused of implementing policies or practices that deprived 
Parkell of adequate healthcare and exposed him to cruel 
conditions.  Bryant allegedly violated Parkell’s Eighth 
Amendment rights by refusing to examine his infected arm 
and provide needed treatment, and Damron allegedly violated 
his rights by maliciously twisting and yanking his arm 
through a door slot, causing immense pain and exacerbating 
his injury.   
 
                                              
 3 CMS provided medical services to the DOC from 
July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2010, at which point CCS 
replaced CMS.  
 4 The complaints named additional defendants who 
were dismissed by the District Court before the summary 
judgment ruling, but those dismissals are not being appealed.     
8 
 
 Parkell also alleged that Danberg, Phelps, Pierce, 
Costello, Rispoli, Klein, CMS, and CCS violated his due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing 
to treat him and subjecting him to conditions significantly 
worse than other inmates with similar circumstances had to 
endure.    
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants on all claims, concluding that:  (1) Parkell could 
not pursue damages from DOC officials in their official 
capacities because of the Eleventh Amendment, and any 
claim for prospective relief was rendered moot when Parkell 
was moved to a different correctional facility; (2) his medical-
needs Eighth Amendment claim failed because any 
deficiencies in his medical care did not rise to the level of 
deliberate indifference to his needs; (3) his conditions-of-
confinement Eighth Amendment claim failed because the 
conditions did not constitute a denial of basic human needs, 
and the defendants were not personally involved in creating 
the conditions; and (4) his due process clam failed because 
the conditions of his confinement did not constitute atypical 
and significant hardship in comparison to general prison 
conditions.  Parkell timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
 We apply a plenary standard of review to a district 
court order granting summary judgment.  Willis v. UPMC 
Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 
2015).  “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the movant 
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law.’”  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  An issue of fact 
is material and genuine if it “affects the outcome of the suit 
under the governing law and could lead a reasonable jury to 
return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.”  Id. 
(quotation and alteration marks omitted).  The party seeking 
summary judgment “has the burden of demonstrating that the 
evidentiary record presents no genuine issue of material fact.”  
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Id.  In order to avoid summary judgment, “the nonmoving 
party must identify facts in the record that would enable them 
to make a sufficient showing on essential elements of their 
case for which they have the burden of proof.”  Id.  
“Reviewing the record as a whole, we will draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and 
will not weigh the evidence or make credibility 
determinations.”  Armour v. Cty. of Beaver, PA, 271 F.3d 
417, 420 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted).   
 
III. 
 
 On appeal, with the aid of pro bono counsel, Parkell 
has clarified and narrowed his claims somewhat.  He argues 
that:  (1) the State Defendants violated his Fourth 
Amendment and procedural due process rights by subjecting 
him to thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches while he was 
in isolation in C-Building; (2) his demand for prospective 
injunctive relief is not moot because he has returned to VCC; 
(3) the State Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment 
rights by subjecting him to harsh conditions in both C-
Building and the infirmary; (4) Nurse Bryant violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights through her deliberate indifference 
to his serious elbow injury;5 (5) CMS and CCS violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights by turning a blind eye to practices 
that deprived him of the full amount of pain medication and 
physical therapy that had been prescribed; and (6) the District 
Court abused its discretion in declining to appoint pro bono 
counsel.   
 
 As set forth in detail below, we conclude that all of 
Parkell’s claims lack sufficient evidence to submit to a fact-
finder, except for his claim that the thrice-daily visual body-
cavity searches in C-Building were unreasonable and violated 
the Fourth Amendment, for which Parkell could potentially 
receive prospective injunctive relief.  We will therefore 
reverse summary judgment as to Parkell’s claim against the 
State Defendants for prospective injunctive relief under the 
Fourth Amendment and remand it to the District Court for 
                                              
 5 Although Nurse Damron is also named in the appeal, 
Parkell makes no argument as to why the District Court erred 
in granting summary judgment in favor of Damron. 
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further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In all other 
respects, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants.  
 
A. 
 
 Parkell’s claim under the Fourth Amendment pertains 
to the thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches conducted in 
C-Building.6  We agree with Parkell that the State Defendants 
were not entitled to summary judgment on the question of 
whether the searches violated the Fourth Amendment.  The 
record before us could support a finding in Parkell’s favor on 
that issue.  The same record could not, however, support a 
finding that any of the State Defendants were personally 
involved in the Fourth Amendment violation and liable for 
money damages.  As to injunctive relief to prevent future 
Fourth Amendment violations, we are unable to determine 
from the record whether the issue is still live and justiciable; 
that question must be answered by the District Court on 
remand.  
1. 
 
a. 
 
 As an initial matter, we must address the applicability 
of the Fourth Amendment to Parkell’s claim.  Following the 
                                              
 6  The Fourteenth Amendment extends Fourth 
Amendment protections to searches and seizures by state 
officials.  Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 
422 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2005).    
 Parkell’s Fourth Amendment claim was not clearly 
pled or argued while he was pro se.  Although courts liberally 
construe pro se pleadings, unrepresented litigants are not 
relieved from the rules of procedure and the requirements of 
substantive law.  McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 
(1993); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). 
 Pro bono counsel now representing Parkell have focused his 
Fourth Amendment claim considerably, noting this legal 
precept.  The State Defendants have raised no objection to our 
consideration of this refocused claim, and, accordingly, we 
will consider counsel’s Fourth Amendment arguments as well 
as the State Defendants’ opposition to those arguments.  
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approach taken by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 558 (1979), we have previously assumed that the 
Fourth Amendment applies to strip searches of inmates 
without so holding.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“Florence I”), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).7  In Bell, 
the Court analyzed a Fourth Amendment claim under the 
“assum[ption] for present purposes that inmates, both 
convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, retain some Fourth 
Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections 
facility.”  Bell, 441 U.S. at 545, 558 (emphasis added).  
 
 The Court subsequently held in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
U.S. 517 (1984), that “the Fourth Amendment proscription 
against unreasonable searches does not apply within the 
confines of the prison cell.”  Id. at 526.  But we do not read 
Hudson to foreclose a Fourth Amendment claim arising from 
an unreasonable search of an inmate’s body.  Hudson 
involved a “shakedown” search of a prisoner’s locker and 
cell, during which his property was destroyed, and the Court 
considered whether “[t]he recognition of privacy rights for 
prisoners in their individual cells” could “be reconciled with 
the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of 
penal institutions.”  Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 538 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The fact of arrest and 
incarceration abates all legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy 
and possessory interests in personal effects, and therefore all 
searches and seizures of the contents of an inmate’s cell are 
reasonable.” (citations omitted)).  The “shakedown” searches 
at issue in Hudson were categorically different from the 
bodily searches described by Parkell.  Despite some of the 
broad language in the opinion, Hudson does not directly 
address the issue before us.   
 
                                              
 7 Although Florence I involved strip searches of 
pretrial detainees, we noted that “[t]he Bell analysis applies 
equally to all individuals [properly assigned to the facility’s 
general population] — whether they be convicted inmates, 
indicted pretrial detainees, contemnors, material witnesses, or 
arrestees awaiting preliminary hearings before a magistrate.”  
621 F.3d at 308 n.7. 
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 The Court’s opinion in Hudson does, however, provide 
the framework for our analysis.  “The applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment turns on whether the person invoking its 
protection can claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate 
expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government 
action.”  Id. at 525 (quotation marks omitted).  In other 
words, we must decide whether an inmate’s expectation of 
bodily privacy “is the kind of expectation that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”  Id. (same).  We hold 
that it is and that the Fourth Amendment therefore grants 
inmates a limited right of bodily privacy, subject to 
reasonable intrusions necessitated by the prison setting.   
 
   We conclude that a right to privacy in one’s own body, 
unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is 
not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so 
fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable 
even in the prison context.  Our conclusion “necessarily 
entails a balancing of interests.”  Id. at 527.  Like the Court in 
Hudson, we recognize that “[t]he curtailment of certain rights 
is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad 
of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief 
among which is internal security,” but also that prisoners 
must be “accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent 
with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives 
of incarceration.”  Id. at 523, 524 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted).    
 
 We also note that most of our sister Courts of Appeals 
have concluded that the Fourth Amendment has some 
applicability to bodily searches in prison.8  And, 
                                              
 8 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 42 
n.5 (1st Cir. 2009) (listing cases) (“Although the Supreme 
Court in Hudson ‘foreclosed any [F]ourth [A]mendment 
challenge to the search of a prison cell,’ this court, like those 
in most other circuits, ‘has recognized a qualitative difference 
between property searches and searches of a prisoner’s 
person.’”) (quoting Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 
(10th Cir. 1989)); Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 
F.3d 560, 572 n.2 (6th Cir. 2013); Bull v. City & Cty. of S.F., 
595 F.3d 964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Levine v. 
Roebuck, 550 F.3d 684, 687 (8th Cir. 2008); Boxer X v. 
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notwithstanding Hudson, the Supreme Court has recently 
applied the Fourth Amendment reasonableness framework 
from Bell in upholding the constitutionality of strip searches 
of pretrial detainees.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders 
of Cty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1516 (2012) 
(“Florence II”).   
 
b. 
 
 Our conclusion that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
bodily searches in prison does not, however, speak to the 
contours of prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights.  They are 
very narrow.  The application of the Fourth Amendment once 
again requires us to balance interests.  “The test of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment . . . requires a 
balancing of the need for the particular search against the 
invasion of personal rights that the search entails.”  Bell, 441 
U.S. at 559.  “Courts must consider the scope of the particular 
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the 
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 
conducted.”  Id.  Inmate search policies are constitutional if 
they “str[ike] a reasonable balance between inmate privacy 
and the needs of the institutions.”  Florence II, 132 S. Ct. at 
1523.  
 
 In balancing those interests in the prison context, we 
must give considerable weight to the “place in which [the 
search] is conducted” — prisons being “places of involuntary 
confinement of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity 
for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct,” Hudson, 
468 U.S. at 526 — and considerable deference to “the 
justification for initiating it.”  Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.  
“[C]orrectional officials must be permitted to devise 
reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession 
of contraband in their facilities.”  Florence II, 132 S. Ct. at 
1517.  A regulation “impinging on an inmate’s constitutional 
rights must be upheld if it is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”  Id. at 1515 (quotation marks omitted).  
We recognize that “[t]he task of determining whether a policy 
                                                                                                     
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006); Nicholas v. 
Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005); Elliott v. Lynn, 38 
F.3d 188, 191 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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is reasonably related to legitimate security interests is 
peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of 
corrections officials.”  Id. at 1517 (quotation marks omitted).  
Unless there is “substantial evidence in the record to indicate 
that the officials have exaggerated their response to these 
considerations courts should ordinarily defer to their expert 
judgment in such matters.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).    
 
 In Bell, the Supreme Court upheld a program under 
which inmates were “required to expose their body cavities 
for visual inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after 
every contact visit with a person from outside the institution.”  
441 U.S. at 558.  After “[b]alancing the significant and 
legitimate security interests of the institution against the 
privacy interests of the inmates,” the Court concluded that 
“visual body-cavity inspections . . . [could] be conducted on 
less than probable cause.”  Id. at 560.  Specifically, the Court 
cited possible “[s]muggling of money, drugs, weapons, and 
other contraband . . . by concealing them in body cavities.”  
Id. at 559.    
 
 But Bell does not categorically uphold all bodily 
searches in prisons.  The facts of our case differ materially 
from those of Bell.  In Bell, the searches occurred after 
visitation sessions involving in-person contact with outsiders.  
In our case, the searches occur thrice daily, regardless of how 
much contact, if any, an isolated inmate has had with other 
people.  We therefore must conduct our own balancing of the 
interests in this case, taking into account “the scope of the 
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the 
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 
conducted.”  Id. at 559.   
 
 The “particular intrusion” at issue here is a 
requirement that three times every day inmates remove their 
clothing and submit their anal and genital regions to visual 
inspection while they squat and cough, whether or not they 
have had any contact with others.  The State Defendants do 
not dispute that this is the policy in C-Building.  The parties 
use the term “strip search” — as do many courts — but “strip 
search,” although an “umbrella term” in some contexts, 
“generally refers to an inspection of a naked individual, 
without any scrutiny of the subject’s body cavities,” whereas 
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“[a] ‘visual body cavity search’ extends to visual inspection 
of the anal and genital areas” and “[a] ‘manual body cavity 
search’ includes some degree of touching or probing of body 
cavities.”  Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 n.3 (1st Cir. 
1985).  Our analysis concerns only the specific type of “strip” 
search at issue in this case — that is, visual body-cavity 
searches, like those in Bell — and not other more intrusive or 
less intrusive types of bodily searches, which entail a 
different balancing of interests.    
 
 Turning to the balancing of interests, we do not 
understand the State Defendants to be disputing that the 
searches are a significant intrusion into bodily privacy.  The 
Court in Bell expressed no doubt that visual body-cavity 
searches constituted a significant intrusion.  441 U.S. at 558, 
560 (“Admittedly, this practice instinctively gives us the most 
pause. . . .  We do not underestimate the degree to which 
these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates.”).  
And we have recognized that even strip searches “less 
intrusive than . . . visual body-cavity searches” are an 
“extreme intrusion on privacy.”  Florence I, 621 F.3d at 307.   
 
 Regarding the countervailing security interests, we 
again emphasize that our review is deferential and that the 
State Defendants’ burden is light, for the reasons already 
given.  Nonetheless, on the record before us, we conclude that 
the particular search policy enforced in C-Building is not 
reasonably related to VCC’s legitimate interests in detecting 
and deterring contraband, particularly given the significant 
intrusiveness of the thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches.    
 
 The State Defendants are unable to articulate a single 
plausible theory as to how inmates in isolation in C-Building 
would have thrice-daily opportunities to smuggle in 
contraband from outside their cells or use unsupervised time 
in their locked cells to transform a harmless object into 
something dangerous.  And we cannot imagine a plausible 
scenario ourselves.  It is undisputed that inmates in isolation 
in C-Building live in stripped-down cells in which they wear 
only t-shirts, boxer briefs, and socks, are not permitted to 
keep rags, towels, or rolls of toilet paper, and are provided 
with soap and other hygienic items only during their thrice-
weekly showers.  And according to Parkell’s version of 
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events, the credibility of which we do not doubt in the context 
of summary judgment, he left his isolation cell only three 
times per week for brief showers and had no human contact 
while in isolation, except for daily visits from nurses for the 
limited purpose of dispensing medication (along with, of 
course, the thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches 
themselves).  He therefore had few, if any, opportunities to 
obtain contraband — and certainly not three opportunities per 
day — which distinguishes this case from the searches in Bell 
that took place after visitations involving in-person contact.   
 
 Parkell’s daily visits from nurses and thrice-weekly 
visits to the showers cannot justify the quantity of searches.  
It may well be reasonable for VCC to conduct visual body-
cavity searches of C-Building inmates after each such visit.9  
But at most, that would justify ten searches per week, not 
twenty-one.  And although the State Defendants have 
suggested that Parkell’s contact with medical personnel while 
in isolation was more extensive, they conceded at oral 
argument that the record does not evidence thrice-daily 
interactions.  In any event, in the context of summary 
judgment, we construe the record in Parkell’s favor, crediting 
the portions that describe only once-daily visits from nurses 
dispensing medication.     
 
 The fact that Parkell, like others in C-Building, was 
being punished for disciplinary violations does not alter our 
conclusion.  Arguably, it does magnify the State Defendants’ 
security interest, insofar as inmates who have already broken 
prison rules may be more likely to seek and utilize dangerous 
contraband.  But the reasonable relationship to the search 
policy is still missing.  When dangerous inmates are 
completely isolated in C-Building, it is the isolation that 
prevents the smuggling of contraband.  Thrice-daily bodily 
searches have little, if any, value in that context unless the 
period of complete isolation has somehow been interrupted.      
 
                                              
 9 The record is unclear as to whether those visits 
actually presented any opportunity for contraband to be 
smuggled.  Indeed, Parkell describes his interactions with 
nurses as taking place through the narrow pass-through slot in 
his cell door, under the supervision of prison officials.   
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 We emphasize the narrowness of our holding.  We do 
not underestimate inmates’ potential zeal and creativity for 
finding ways to smuggle or create dangerous contraband if 
given any opportunity to do so.  In Bell, the probability that 
an inmate would obtain contraband during a visitation was 
low but still sufficient to justify the search policy.  But here, 
the probability is vanishingly small that an inmate locked in a 
stripped-down isolation cell in C-Building, once searched, 
could then obtain contraband during a subsequent eight-hour 
period involving no human contact.  As such, the intrusive 
thrice-daily searches are not a reasonable means of advancing 
VCC’s legitimate interest in detecting and deterring 
contraband.   
 
 We do not mean to suggest that VCC must point to a 
history of C-Building inmates who successfully smuggled 
contraband into their isolation cells.  As in Bell, the lack of 
history may be “a testament to the effectiveness of this search 
technique as a deterrent.”  Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.  It is the 
virtual impossibility of smuggling contraband into C-
Building, rather than the absence of a history of smuggling, 
that is relevant here.  Deterrence is a legitimate concern but a 
far less weighty concern when the conduct to be deterred is 
already virtually impossible.    
 
 Nor does our holding concern individualized 
suspicion.  Individualized suspicion that a C-Building inmate 
had somehow obtained contraband would, of course, still 
justify a search of that particular inmate.  This case concerns 
the implementation of general, routine search policies, for 
which individualized suspicion is not required.  As we have 
previously noted, “Bell did not require individualized 
suspicion for each inmate searched; it assessed the facial 
constitutionality of the policy as a whole, as applied to all 
inmates.”  Florence I, 621 F.3d at 308.  “The absence of an 
individualized suspicion requirement in Bell is consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment doctrine of special needs 
searches.”  Id. at 308 n.8; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989) (categorizing 
Bell as a “special needs” search case); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 
538 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that in certain 
contexts, such as the one considered in Bell, “the Court has 
rejected the case-by-case approach to the ‘reasonableness’ 
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inquiry in favor of an approach that determines the 
reasonableness of contested practices in a categorical 
fashion”).  “Under the ‘special needs’ analysis, the 
government need not show probable cause or even 
individualized suspicion for its search” and instead  “must 
prove that its search meets a general test of ‘reasonableness.’”  
Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d Cir. 
1998).    
 
 Routine, suspicionless inmate search policies may 
sweep quite broadly and still be reasonable.  In Florence II, 
the Supreme Court declined to require jails to adopt a policy 
of exempting new detainees “who ha[d] not been arrested for 
a serious crime or for any offense involving a weapon or 
drugs” from the blanket strip searches conducted before 
detainees were committed to the general population.  Florence 
II, 132 S. Ct. at 1520.  The Court held that it was reasonable 
for jails to conclude that such an exemption was 
“unworkable” because “the seriousness of an offense is a poor 
predictor of who has contraband” and “it would be difficult in 
practice to determine whether individual detainees fall within 
the proposed exemption.”  Id.  The Court in Florence II 
recognized that narrowly targeted search policies are 
generally not required in prisons and jails because they tend 
to be incompatible with the setting.  They are often difficult, 
if not impossible, to implement without an unacceptable risk 
of false negatives (instances in which dangerous contraband 
is missed because an inmate is incorrectly classified as low-
risk and subjected to less thorough searches).  Thus, it is 
usually reasonable for prisons to favor more broadly drawn 
search policies.   
 
 But VCC’s search policy sweeps too broadly with 
insufficient justification.  VCC’s security interests are not 
reasonably advanced by a blanket policy of frequently and 
intrusively searching inmates who have previously been 
thoroughly searched and held in a stripped-down isolation 
cell without human contact ever since.10  Unlike the search 
                                              
 10 In similar cases, our sister Courts of Appeals have 
allowed inmates to pursue Fourth Amendment claims after 
being subjected to bodily searches when they had had no 
opportunity to obtain contraband.  See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 
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policy in Florence II, VCC’s search policy in C-Building is 
not a blanket policy that has been reasonably selected over a 
more targeted policy that would be unworkable.  In Florence 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 218, 261 n.44 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[C]onsistent with 
Hodges, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they were strip 
searched when there was no opportunity to acquire 
contraband, including in instances where they were shackled 
and under escort, or were never permitted to leave their 
cells.”); Franklin v. Lockhart, 769 F.2d 509, 510-11 (8th Cir. 
1985) (“[T]he evidence shows that Franklin was strip 
searched twice a day while he was confined to his cell with 
access to only staff-issued meals and tissue.  We cannot say 
that defendants’ mere declaration that these searches occurred 
‘according to policy’ to maintain security and prevent the 
flow of contraband clearly establishes defendants’ right to 
judgment on this claim.  Though defendants’ objectives may 
indeed have been legitimate, . . . [t]he search must be 
reasonable in its scope and its manner of execution.”); 
Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F.2d 34, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The 
second search took place shortly after the first, and Hodges 
had been under continuous escort.  Under these circumstances 
it seems clear that there was no possibility that Hodges could 
have obtained and concealed contraband.  Thus the second 
search appears to have been unnecessary.  We therefore 
cannot say that Hodges has failed to state a constitutional 
claim.”); Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(“Guards handcuff the inmates before they leave the Control 
Unit and escort them to the visitation area.  The inmates are 
separated from the visitors by plexiglass, and guards observe 
these visits.  We do not believe that the rationale announced 
in Bell v. Wolfish, supra, justifies these strip searches.  Thus, 
the Supreme Court in Wolfish relied on the possibility of 
contraband being brought into the prison during contact visits 
to justify the use of strip searches.  Those contact visits were 
not closely supervised by guards.  Wolfish should not be 
extended to the facts of this case without a showing that there 
is some risk that contraband will be smuggled into Marion 
during non-contact, supervised visits, or that some other risk 
within the prison will be presented.  Since defendants do not 
discuss the searches in their brief, we are not in a position to 
dispose of the issue and, therefore, the district court should 
consider it on remand.”).   
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II, it was plausible that any new detainee might be carrying 
contraband from the outside world into the institution, and 
distinguishing between high-risk detainees and low-risk 
detainees would have been costly and error-prone.11  But in 
our case, the only generalized risk that C-Building inmates 
will obtain contraband arises from their limited contact with 
the world outside their stripped-down cells.  Tying routine 
visual body-cavity searches to instances of outside contact, 
rather than an unyielding thrice-daily schedule, would seem 
to be a simple and categorical policy to implement, especially 
given that prison officials have the ability to closely regulate 
isolated inmates’ limited contact with the world outside their 
cells; the State Defendants have given us no reason to 
conclude otherwise.  And, of course, those officials are free to 
search C-Building inmates individually suspected of 
possessing contraband.    
 
 Thus, construing the record in Parkell’s favor, we 
conclude that the search policy in its present form is an 
“exaggerated . . . response to [security] considerations” and 
thus violates the Fourth Amendment.  Florence II, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1517.  The State Defendants were therefore not entitled to 
summary judgment on Parkell’s Fourth Amendment claim.    
   
2. 
 
 Having determined that Parkell presents a triable 
Fourth Amendment claim, we next consider whether Parkell 
may pursue money damages from the State Defendants, who 
did not themselves conduct the visual body-cavity searches 
but may have had supervisory involvement.  A plaintiff 
“cannot predicate liability on her § 1983 claims on a 
respondeat superior basis.”  Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015).  We have recognized 
that “there are two theories of supervisory liability, one under 
which supervisors can be liable if they established and 
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused 
the constitutional harm, and another under which they can be 
                                              
 11 In their concurring opinions in Florence II, Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito (members of the five-person 
majority) both emphasized the narrowness of the Court’s 
holding.  See 132 S. Ct. at 1523-25.   
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liable if they participated in violating plaintiff’s rights, 
directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, 
had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ 
violations.”  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 
n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation and alteration marks omitted).  
Parkell argues that both theories apply here but has not 
supported his argument with evidence.  Although it is 
certainly plausible that some of the named defendants had 
supervisory involvement in the searches, Parkell has not come 
forward with enough evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to 
conclude that they did.   
 
 As to Commissioner Danberg, Parkell points only to 
Danberg’s generalized admission that he “is familiar with the 
policies of the Department of Correction” and “approved the 
DOC policies.”  App. 775.  “[T]o establish a claim against a 
policymaker under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege and prove 
that the official established or enforced policies and practices 
directly causing the constitutional violation.”  Chavarriaga, 
806 F.3d at 223.  The problem with Parkell’s attempt to hold 
Danberg liable is that he has not pointed to any evidence of 
where the search policy, practice, or custom came from.  
Danberg does not acknowledge any involvement in 
establishing or enforcing any specific policies (much less 
specific search policies in C-Building or at VCC), or even any 
awareness that the searches were occurring.  And although 
the defendants concede that inmates in isolation were 
routinely subjected to thrice-daily visual body-cavity 
searches, it is unclear whether this was in accordance with 
official DOC policy endorsed by Danberg, a policy limited to 
VCC, or even just an informal practice or custom.  To 
presume that the search practices arose from Danberg’s 
policies merely because of his position as commissioner is to 
rely on respondeat superior.   
 
 Likewise, there is no evidence linking Warden Phelps 
to the establishment of the search policy, practice, or custom 
in C-Building.  Unlike Danberg, however, Phelps has 
admitted knowledge that C-Building inmates were strip 
searched three times per day.  If Phelps knew about the search 
practices in C-Building and had authority to change them but 
chose not to, that might constitute supervisory involvement in 
violating Parkell’s rights.  Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 n.5 
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(supervisors liable if, “as the persons in charge, [they] had 
knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ 
violations”).  But there is no evidence that Phelps had such 
authority.  Parkell has merely asserted in a brief that “Phelps, 
as Warden, w[as] responsible for ensuring . . . compli[ance] 
with the acknowledged strip search policy,” without pointing 
us to any facts or legal authorities to support the assertion.  
Reply Br. 21.  We have no evidence addressing whether C-
Building had dominion over its own search practices, 
followed orders from the warden on the matter, or was held to 
policies delivered directly from the DOC.  And we do not 
believe that an official is “enforcing,” “maintaining,” or 
“acquiescing in” a policy merely because the official 
passively permits his subordinates to implement a policy that 
was set by someone else and is beyond the official’s authority 
to change.  Knowing nothing more than Phelps’s title as 
warden, a factfinder could not reasonably conclude that 
Phelps was a “person[ ] in charge” of search practices in C-
Building and thereby “acquiesced” in the practice of thrice-
daily visual body-cavity searches.  See Santiago, 629 F.3d at 
129 n.5. 
 
 Like Phelps, Captain Rispoli admits awareness of the 
search practices in C-Building, but there is no evidence of 
Rispoli’s role in establishing or enforcing the practices, and it 
is unclear whether Rispoli had any authority to intercede.  
Rispoli admits to being the “unit commander for the 
maximum security units, including the Secured Housing Unit 
(“SHU”), which consists of Buildings 17, 18, and 19.”  App. 
414.  He then describes Building 18 and C-Building as 
separate “units” and says, “The shift commander for the 
maximum security housing units is responsible for assigning 
inmates to an isolation unit.  When I am the shift commander, 
I make those assignments. . . .  I am responsible for the 
inmates assigned to Building 18 isolation.  But I am familiar 
with both the Building 18 isolation unit and the C-Building 
isolation unit.”  App. 415.  The most natural reading of those 
statements is that Rispoli commanded isolation units other 
than C-Building.  But even if there were ambiguity to be 
resolved in Parkell’s favor, there would still be insufficient 
evidence that Rispoli’s position gave him control over search 
policies such that he could be charged with “acquiescence” in 
their enforcement.   
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 The evidence of the remaining State Defendants’ 
involvement is even weaker.  Parkell points only to Deputy 
Warden Pierce’s admission that he is “familiar with DOC 
policies” and Major Costello’s admission that he is “aware of 
security matters in the areas of the institution in which he [is] 
assigned.”  Reply Br. 22 (citing App. 781-82).  There is no 
evidence of Deputy Warden Klein’s knowledge of the 
searches.  
 
 We therefore affirm the District Court insofar as it 
granted summary judgment in favor of the State Defendants 
in relation to any Fourth Amendment claim for money 
damages.   
 
3. 
 
 Our conclusion that the State Defendants lacked 
personal involvement in past constitutional violations does 
not preclude Parkell from obtaining prospective injunctive 
relief for ongoing violations.  Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. 
& Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); Gonzalez v. 
Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 
see also Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70, 77 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiffs 
failed to allege a plausible claim to relief on the basis of the 
supervisors’ ‘knowledge and acquiescence’ or any other 
similar theory of liability . . . [but] are still free to pursue their 
official capacity claims for injunctive relief against any 
further intimidation or unlawful entry into their home.”); 
Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(similar).  In seeking a prospective injunction against the 
implementation of an unconstitutional state policy, Parkell is 
required to name an official or officials “who can 
appropriately respond to injunctive relief.”  Hartmann, 707 
F.3d at 1127; see also Gonzalez, 663 F.3d at 315 (proper 
defendant is one “responsible for ensuring that any injunctive 
relief is carried out”).  He has done so.  Although we leave it 
to the District Court to determine which defendants would 
appropriately be named in an injunction should Parkell 
prevail on his claim, at the very least Commissioner Danberg 
or his successor could appropriately respond to injunctive 
relief.  
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 The State Defendants, however, argue that the issue of 
injunctive relief is moot.  They do not deny that Parkell is 
currently incarcerated at VCC, nor do they contend that the 
search practices in the isolation units have changed.12  Rather, 
they argue that the issue is moot because Parkell’s Fourth 
Amendment claim arose from his temporary confinement in 
C-Building and he is no longer confined there.  We agree 
with the State Defendants but also believe that an exception 
to the mootness doctrine could potentially apply.  Parkell 
argues that, in light of his current incarceration at VCC and 
the likelihood of a return to isolation units in the future, a 
Fourth Amendment violation is “capable of repetition yet 
evading review,” which makes injunctive relief appropriate.  
Reply Br. 26.  He requests that we at least remand the issue to 
the District Court to consider in the first instance with the aid 
of further factual development.   
 
 The “capable of repetition yet evading review” 
doctrine is an exception to mootness that applies when “(1) 
the challenged action is, in its duration, too short to be fully 
litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will 
be subject to the same action again.”  United Indus., Serv., 
Transp., Prof’l & Gov’t Workers of N. Am. Seafarers Int’l 
Union ex rel. Bason v. Gov’t of V.I., 767 F.3d 193, 212 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).  The exception is 
“narrow and available only in exceptional situations.”  
Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quotation marks omitted).   
 
 The capable-of-repetition exception is inapplicable 
when a previously incarcerated plaintiff has been completely 
released from the system through expiration of a sentence or 
                                              
 12 We note that, even if VCC had voluntarily changed 
its search practices since the lawsuit was filed, that alone 
would not necessarily moot Parkell’s claim for injunctive 
relief.  DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 310 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“[V]oluntary cessation does not moot a case or 
controversy unless subsequent events make it absolutely clear 
that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be 
expected to recur.” (quotation and alteration marks omitted)).   
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acquittal upon retrial, because it would be mere “conjecture” 
to conclude that the plaintiff might be reincarcerated and 
subjected to the same conditions again.  See, e.g., Doe v. 
Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 313-14 (3d Cir. 2001) (plaintiff 
acquitted upon retrial).  A more difficult and fact-intensive 
question is raised, however, when the plaintiff is still 
connected to the system.  In Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227 
(3d Cir. 1980), we held that there was a “realistic possibility 
of reincarceration” for a parolee “because of the low standard 
for reincarceration.”  Id. at 232-33 (noting that the parole 
commission “cannot be totally arbitrary, [but] may 
nevertheless revoke [his] parole status if at any time . . . [it] is 
of the opinion that [he] will be benefited by further treatment 
in an institution or other facility” (quotation marks omitted)).  
But in Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1993), a 
prisoner had been released from a maximum security unit 
three-and-a-half years into his eight-year sentence, and the 
District Court applied the capable-of-repetition exception, 
citing “the procedures through which inmates may be 
classified into and out of maximum security.”  Abdul-Akbar 
v. Watson, 775 F. Supp. 735, 755 (D. Del. 1991).  When the 
case was appealed, we rejected the capable-of-repetition 
theory and held that the District Court had improperly 
“speculat[ed]” that the prisoner could be returned to a 
maximum security unit.  4 F.3d at 197, 206-07.  
 
 Parkell’s point is well-taken that, as a general matter, 
confinement of inmates in isolation units is hardly unusual, 
which we have acknowledged in other contexts.  Cf. Torres v. 
Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[D]isciplinary 
detention and administrative segregation [are] the sort[s] of 
confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate 
receiving at some point in their incarceration . . . .”).  But 
Parkell must present more than generalities; he must establish 
a reasonable expectation that he, specifically, will again be 
subjected to the unconstitutional search practices carried out 
in VCC’s isolation units.  See OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 168 (3d Cir. 2000) (placing the 
burden on the plaintiff to show that the capable-of-repetition 
exception applied).  We reject Parkell’s last-minute effort to 
meet that burden by claiming to have returned to isolation for 
five days in June 2015, which is not reflected in the record 
and is merely asserted in his reply brief.  
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 We are also mindful, however, that the issue was 
understandably never explored in the District Court,13 where 
discovery could have occurred and factual findings could 
have been made regarding crucial issues, such as Parkell’s 
history of confinement in isolation units, the frequency with 
which and conditions under which VCC officials send 
inmates to isolation units, and exactly how much discretion 
officials have to do so.  We will therefore leave it for the 
District Court to determine on remand whether Parkell’s 
request for injunctive relief in relation to the visual body-
cavity searches remains a live issue under the capable-of-
repetition exception to mootness.  See, e.g., Williams v. 
Anderson, 959 F.2d 1411, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992) (capable-of-
repetition finding was “fact-intensive” and not well-
developed on the record and therefore “best left to the district 
court”). 
 
B. 
 
 Parkell also challenges the visual body-cavity searches 
as violating his right to procedural due process.  He concedes 
that he was given notice and a hearing concerning his 
placement in isolation.  His claim is that, in addition to that 
process, he was also owed notice about the visual body-cavity 
searches specifically and a hearing on the matter.  We 
disagree and will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on this claim.    
 
 A prisoner holds a liberty interest triggering due 
process if either (1) “state statutes and regulations create a 
liberty interest in freedom from restraint that imposes an 
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to 
the ordinary incidents of prison life,” or (2) “severe changes 
in conditions of confinement amount to a grievous loss that 
should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice and 
an adequate hearing.”  Evans v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 
                                              
 13 The District Court was under the impression that 
Parkell was no longer at VCC, but Parkell had in fact been 
returned to VCC three weeks before the District Court’s 
summary judgment ruling.  The District Court was not 
informed of Parkell’s return.    
27 
 
F.3d 650, 663 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).  
Parkell argues only the “severe changes” theory.  
 
  Examples of “severe changes in in conditions of 
confinement” include “forced administration of antipsychotic 
medication, or involuntary transfer to a mental hospital, or, 
for a prisoner not convicted of a sex offense, forced 
participation in sex-offender therapy.”  Id. at 665 (citations 
omitted).  Such changes result in punishment that is 
“qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically 
suffered by a person convicted of crime, and ha[s] 
stigmatizing consequences.”  Renchenski v. Williams, 622 
F.3d 315, 326 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).   
 
 We cannot say that routine visual body-cavity searches 
are “qualitatively different from the punishment 
characteristically suffered by a person convicted of a crime,” 
that they impose “stigmatizing consequences” akin to being 
labeled psychotic or a sex offender, id., or that they otherwise 
constitute “severe changes in conditions of confinement 
amount[ing] to a grievous loss,” Evans, 645 F.3d at 663.  
Parkell therefore lacks a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest under a “severe changes” theory, and his procedural 
due process claim fails.   
 
C. 
 
 Parkell raises two Eighth Amendment claims:  (1) that 
the State Defendants subjected him to harsh conditions of 
confinement and (2) that the Medical Defendants ignored his 
medical needs.  Because there is insufficient evidence of 
deliberate indifference as to either claim, we will affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on these claims.  
 
1. 
 
 A claim regarding prison conditions “does not rise to 
the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless:  (1) the 
prison official deprived the prisoner of the minimal civilized 
measure of life’s necessities; and (2) the prison official acted 
with deliberate indifference in doing so, thereby exposing the 
inmate to a substantial risk of serious damage to her future 
health.”  Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 226.  We need not 
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determine whether Parkell was deprived of “the minimal 
civilized measure of life’s necessities” because the record 
would not permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 
State Defendants were deliberately indifferent.  See id.  We 
will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in the State Defendants’ favor as to Parkell’s Eighth 
Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim.     
 
 In the Eighth Amendment context, “deliberate 
indifference” is “a subjective standard of liability consistent 
with recklessness as that term is defined in criminal law.”  
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 811 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).  
A prison official is deliberately indifferent if the official 
“knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm 
and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures 
to abate it.”  Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 229 (quotation marks 
omitted).  A plaintiff “may demonstrate deliberate 
indifference by showing that the risk of harm was 
longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted 
by prison officials in the past such that the defendants must 
have known about the risk.”  Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. 
Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 
omitted).  But the plaintiff must show that the officials were 
“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 
a substantial risk of harm exists, and that they also drew the 
inference.”  Id. (quotation and alteration marks omitted).  “It 
is not enough merely to find that a reasonable person would 
have known, or that the defendant should have known . . . .”  
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 n.8 (1994).   
 
 Parkell attests that during his first stay in the infirmary 
in January 2009, he was held in a cell without working heat, 
and during his second stay in March 2011, he was permitted 
no exercise and no showers for over two weeks.  He also 
attests that during his time in C-Building isolation in 
November 2009, he was subjected to thrice-daily visual body-
cavity searches and denied exercise and access to basic 
hygienic materials.  And he claims to have been denied access 
to medical personnel during his time in both the infirmary and 
C-Building, insofar as the nurses who visited refused to 
examine him, citing a policy against entering the cells.  
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 As evidence of the State Defendants’ deliberate 
indifference, Parkell points to little more than their 
“admissions” of awareness of certain DOC policies.  That 
evidence fails because most of the policies of which the 
defendants admit to have knowledge differ in subtle but 
important ways from the conditions that Parkell claims to 
have experienced.  Thus, although the defendants admit 
knowledge of restrictive policies, those policies do not 
amount to cruel and unusual punishment.  And to the extent 
that Parkell may have experienced even harsher conditions 
beyond what those policies call for, there is no evidence that 
the defendants were aware of that.   
 
 In his affidavit, Pierce claims that there are no VCC 
policies preventing medical staff from entering the cells of 
maximum-security inmates housed in the infirmary, as long 
as the staffer is accompanied by two other officers; no 
policies preventing maximum-security inmates housed in the 
infirmary from showering; and no policies preventing an 
inmate from receiving extra blankets or clothing if the heat is 
malfunctioning.  He admits that ice and recreation time are 
not ordinarily provided to maximum-security inmates housed 
in the infirmary but says that both would be provided if 
directed by a doctor.  He also admits that the infirmary had 
intermittent heating problems in 2009, but never for extended 
periods.  He adds that it was practice to provide extra blankets 
when heating problems arose, and certainly not practice to 
deny extra blankets to an inmate who requested them.  In his 
affidavit, Rispoli claims that inmates in isolation in C-
Building are taken out of their cells for one hour three times 
per week, during which time they can shower and recreate.  
According to him, inmates in C-Building are permitted 
medical treatment, which they can request, and are checked at 
every shift for medical needs.  In his discovery responses, 
Phelps claims that inmates in isolation are seen by medical 
staff every eight hours and can be taken out of isolation for 
treatment if needed.  He says that soap and hygienic items are 
provided during shower and recreation time, and while 
inmates may not store toilet paper in their cells, it is provided 
upon request.  
 
 The defendants do concede that thrice-daily visual-
body cavity searches occurred for inmates in isolation, but 
30 
 
such searches do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
unless they are “undertaken maliciously or for the purposes of 
sexually abusing an inmate.”  Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 
252, 258 (2d Cir. 2015); see also King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 
889, 897 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“A prisoner states a 
claim under the Eighth Amendment when he plausibly alleges 
that the strip-search in question was motivated by a desire to 
harass or humiliate . . . .”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 
916 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).  As Parkell does not point 
to any evidence of maliciousness, the search policy cannot 
serve as a basis for imposing Eighth Amendment liability on 
the defendants.   
 
 The only other evidence of the State Defendants’ 
knowledge of the conditions that Parkell experienced are two 
letters signed by Phelps, informing Parkell of the results of 
his grievance appeals.  But those particular letters refer to 
grievances (nos. 191813 and 192952) that deal only with 
Parkell’s requests for further medical services, not relief from 
harsh conditions.  Although the letters from Phelps could 
demonstrate Phelps’s awareness of Parkell’s medical 
complaints,14 they do not demonstrate deliberate indifference, 
as Phelps is not medical staff.  See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 
F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (non-medical defendants not 
deliberately indifferent “simply because they failed to 
respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who 
was already being treated by the prison doctor”); Spruill v. 
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a reason 
to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their 
assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-
medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the 
Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate 
indifference.”).  
 
                                              
 14 Our oft-cited holding in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 
F.2d 1195, 1208 (3d Cir. 1988) that the mere filing of a 
grievance does not show actual knowledge by a supervisor is 
not applicable, as Phelps’s letters show that he actually had 
reviewed the grievances.  Cf. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 
236, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that an official who 
wrote back in response to a grievance had “played an active 
role” in a constitutional violation).   
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 A grievance expressly challenging a practice of 
prohibiting medical personnel from interacting with an inmate 
might require intervention by non-medical staff, in that it 
would suggest that the inmate was not receiving care at all.  
But Parkell’s grievances were different.  Parkell wrote that he 
“complain[ed] often and mostly [was] ignored,” described his 
symptoms, and asked for further treatments beyond what he 
was already receiving.  App. 492.  The written responses to 
those grievance show that the prison officials ensured that 
Parkell was under the care of medical personnel and being 
treated, and therefore that the officials were not deliberately 
indifferent.  See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655-56 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (“Miller reviewed Greeno’s complaints and 
verified with the medical officials that Greeno was receiving 
treatment.  We do not think Miller’s failure to take further 
action . . . can be viewed as deliberate indifference.”).   
 
  Because there is insufficient evidence to find 
deliberate indifference on the part of any of the State 
Defendants, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in the State Defendants’ favor as to 
Parkell’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement 
claim.    
 
2. 
 
 We now turn to Parkell’s Eighth Amendment medical-
needs claim.  To prove this claim, “evidence must show (i) a 
serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison 
officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.”  
Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  The parties dispute only the issue of deliberate 
indifference, not whether Parkell had a serious medical need.  
The record would not permit a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that the Medical Defendants were deliberately 
indifferent to Parkell’s medical needs, and therefore we will 
affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in the 
Medical Defendants’ favor as to this claim. 
 
 We have acknowledged that “prison authorities are 
accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment 
of prisoners.”  Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67.  A prisoner bringing a 
medical-needs claim “must show more than negligence; he 
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must show ‘deliberate indifference’ to a serious medical 
need.”  Id.  “Allegations of medical malpractice are not 
sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation,” nor is 
“[m]ere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment.”  
Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235.  A “failure to provide adequate care . 
. . [that] was deliberate, and motivated by non-medical 
factors” is actionable under the Eighth Amendment, but 
“inadequate care [that] was a result of an error in medical 
judgment” is not.  Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69.  “We have found 
‘deliberate indifference’ in a variety of circumstances, 
including where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s 
need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to 
provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a 
non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving 
needed or recommended medical treatment.”  Rouse v. 
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 
  First, Parkell argues that Nurse Bryant violated his 
Eighth Amendment right to medical treatment during her 
encounter with him in January 2009.  Parkell attests that 
Bryant refused to let him speak to describe his symptoms, 
accused him of “run[ning] game” to obtain Vicodin, declared 
that she was not “fall[ing] for it,” told him he could purchase 
aspirin himself, and instructed prison officers to “get him out 
of here.”  App. 96, 178.  If Bryant had ignored Parkell’s 
medical needs, her brusqueness might suggest that she did so 
deliberately and for non-medical reasons.  But Bryant did not 
ignore his needs.  Parkell claims that Bryant never properly 
examined his injury in person even though he had a “massive 
infection” and that she should have given him medication for 
pain.  App. 96, 178.  But there is no dispute that the most 
serious complications of Parkell’s injury (including the 
visible releasing of pus) had not yet appeared when he saw 
Bryant.  There is also no dispute that Bryant ordered an x-ray 
that showed normal results.  And there is nothing in the 
record suggesting that, at the time that Parkell saw Bryant, it 
was improper to recommend over-the-counter pain 
medication rather than to seek a prescription from a doctor.  
Particularly in light of the normal x-ray results, a factfinder 
could not reasonably conclude that Bryant deliberately 
ignored risks to Parkell’s health.  
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 Second, Parkell argues that CMS and CCS deprived 
him of needed medical care, in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, in two respects:  (1) Parkell was twice (first in 
August 2009 on CMS’s watch, then again in March 2011 on 
CCS’s watch) prescribed regular physical therapy but was 
only provided with limited, sporadic therapy, and his injury 
was exacerbated as a result; (2) Parkell was prescribed pain 
medication in March 2011, but CCS provided only half the 
prescribed dosage and, on some occasions, even less.  Again, 
the contested issue is deliberate indifference — that is, 
whether “inadequate care was a result of an error in medical 
judgment” or “deliberate, and motivated by non-medical 
factors,” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 — and Parkell fails to make 
a sufficient showing.      
 
  The deliberate indifference inquiry is complicated by 
the fact that CMS and CCS are institutional defendants.  It is 
not enough for Parkell to show that a medical staffer was 
deliberately indifferent to his needs, because CMS and CCS 
“cannot be held responsible for the acts of [their] employees 
under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”  
Natale, 318 F.3d at 583.  Parkell must impute that deliberate 
indifference to CMS and CCS by showing that they “turned a 
blind eye to an obviously inadequate practice that was likely 
to result in the violation of constitutional rights” such that 
they, as “policymaker[s,] can reasonably be said to have been 
deliberately indifferent to the need.”  Id. at 584 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Parkell has not brought claims against 
specific CMS or CCS employees other than Bryant.  But in 
order to succeed in his claim against CMS and CCS for 
violating the Eighth Amendment, Parkell need not name 
particular CMS or CCS employees who were deliberately 
indifferent, as long as a factfinder could conclude that some 
CMS or CCS employee was deliberately indifferent and the 
deliberate indifference can be attributed to CMS or CCS.  See 
id. at 583 n.8.   
 
 As to the failure to provide prescribed physical 
therapy, Parkell argues that there was no medical reason to 
deny him therapy and the true reason was that, as a general 
practice, therapy for SHU inmates was often skipped because 
the prison lacked enough staff to transport them from the 
SHU or were unable to transport them when certain security 
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events occurred.15  CMS and CCS do not deny this but rather 
argue that they are not liable because the alleged logistical 
difficulties that undermined Parkell’s therapy were 
indisputably caused by the DOC, which is the relevant 
“policymaker” in that arena, not CMS and CCS.  See Natale, 
318 F.3d at 584.   
 
 We agree with CMS and CCS.  Systemic logistical 
constraints such as understaffing, which are unrelated to 
medical judgment, will typically not excuse failure to provide 
adequate medical care.  See Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. 
Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that 
deliberate indifference is shown “where the size of the 
medical staff at a prison in relation to the number of inmates 
having serious health problems constitutes an effective denial 
of access to diagnosis and treatment”).  But there is a 
difference between actors who are actually responsible for 
those logistical constraints (or capable of remedying them) 
and actors who are not.  In Pierce, it was the jail 
administration, not the individual medical providers, that was 
responsible for the understaffing and deliberately indifferent 
to its effects.  See id. at 762-63; see also Byrd v. Shannon, 
715 F.3d 117, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[Byrd] has not shown 
that the delays in supplying his eye drops were due to 
deliberate indifference. . . .  Under Byrd’s self-medication 
program, he is responsible for the renewal of his 
prescriptions, and thus, he was responsible for this delay.  
Other delays were caused by the pharmacy that provided the 
eye drops.  Therefore, the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment to [prison healthcare officials].”).  That 
the DOC’s transportation practices caused SHU inmates to 
miss needed physical therapy does not mean that CMS or 
CCS was indifferent to the problem.  And even if they were 
indifferent, their indifference could not have been the cause 
of Parkell’s inadequate therapy, as there is no evidence that 
CMS or CCS had control over inmate transportation.  While 
                                              
 15 Parkell reportedly learned this from a conversation 
with his physical therapist, and it is unclear whether his 
statements would be admissible at a trial.  But CMS and CCS 
do not dispute Parkell’s claims about the transportation 
difficulties; indeed, their defense relies on it.   
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Parkell could conceivably sue DOC officials in relation to the 
transportation practices, he has not done so.     
 
 Parkell’s medical-needs claim also fails in relation to 
his pain medication prescription (which implicates only 
CCS).  According to Parkell’s version of events, which CCS 
disputes, he was initially prescribed four Vicodin per day by 
Dr. DuShuttle, an amount that he never received once he 
returned to VCC.  He typically received only two Vicodin per 
day, and on three occasions (March 23, 2011, March 29, 
2011, and April 6, 2011) doses were missed.  Nurses told 
Parkell that CCS’s medical director could modify prescription 
recommendations made by outside consulting doctors and 
that the missed doses were caused by a short-term shortage. 
 
 With regard to the halving of the dosage, there is 
insufficient evidence that it was done for non-medical 
reasons, as Parkell alleges.  The record is essentially silent as 
to why CCS’s medical director would have reduced Parkell’s 
pain medication below the level recommended by an outside 
consulting doctor (assuming, of course, that this actually 
happened).  There could be several legitimate medical reasons 
for doing so, including generalized professional disagreement 
about the appropriate level of prescription pain medication for 
most patients.  And a fact-finder could not reasonably reject 
those explanations in favor of an illegitimate explanation 
merely because Parkell claims to have heard other inmates 
say that “[the medical director] slash[es] in half everybody’s 
order when you go out” to see a specialist, and to have heard 
Dr. DuShuttle say that “[t]hey cut my orders every time I 
make an order,” App. 328 — even if those statements were 
admissible as evidence at trial.   
 
  As to the three missed doses, there is insufficient 
evidence that CCS turned a blind eye to an inadequate 
practice happening on its watch.  There is no evidence that 
shortages were a common or systemic problem.  And there is 
no evidence that CCS leadership would have known about 
isolated shortages in time to intervene.  Parkell filed a 
grievance on April 16, 2011, alluding vaguely to “lapses in 
medication occur[ring] randomly,” App. 234, but even if that 
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was sufficient to put CCS on notice, all three of the alleged 
shortages predated the grievance.16  
 
 We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Medical Defendants in 
relation to Parkell’s Eighth Amendment medical-needs 
claims.17   
 
IV. 
 
 Finally, we reject Parkell’s argument that the District 
Court abused its discretion by denying him appointed 
counsel.  
 “Indigent civil litigants possess neither a constitutional 
nor a statutory right to appointed counsel.”  Montgomery v. 
Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002).  Appointing 
counsel for an indigent civil litigant is “usually only granted 
upon a showing of special circumstances indicating the 
likelihood of substantial prejudice to him resulting, for 
example, from his probable inability without such assistance 
to present the facts and legal issues to the court in a complex 
                                              
 16 Parkell also cites a “Memorandum of Agreement 
between the United States Department of Justice and the State 
of Delaware that resulted from a DOJ investigation of 
Delaware prison facilities, including [VCC],” but Parkell only 
seeks to use this as evidence that “CMS and the DOC” — not 
CCS, which entered the picture later — “were on notice 
regarding deficiencies in the medical care afforded to 
inmates.”  Parkell Br. 49-50.  Parkell also fails to explain 
what “deficiencies” were actually noted in the Memorandum 
and how they would have put CMS “on notice” with regard to 
the specific issues in this lawsuit.   
 17 We do not address CCS’s argument that Parkell’s 
claim is barred by his failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.  Aside from being unnecessary to our disposition of 
the case, the issue was forfeited because CCS did not raise 
this issue in its summary judgment motion in the District 
Court, and thus Parkell never had an opportunity to respond 
with evidence of exhaustion.  Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 
295 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative 
defense to be pleaded by the defendant.”).  
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but arguably meritorious case.”  Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 
F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).   
 
 District courts have “broad discretion to determine 
whether appointment of counsel in a civil case would be 
appropriate.”  Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 498 (quotation marks 
omitted).  First, the court “must assess whether the claimant’s 
case has some arguable merit.”  Id. at 498-99.  If there is 
arguable merit, then the court should consider a range of 
factors, including:   
 
 1. the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her 
 own case; 2. the difficulty of the particular 
 legal issues; 3. the degree to which factual 
 investigation will be necessary and the ability 
 of the plaintiff to pursue investigation; 4. the 
 plaintiff’s capacity to retain counsel on his or 
 her own behalf; 5.  the extent to which a  case is 
 likely to turn on credibility  determinations, and; 
 6.  whether the case  will require testimony from 
 expert witnesses.   
Id. at 499.  These factors are “not exhaustive, but should 
serve as a guidepost for the district courts.”  Id. (quotation 
marks omitted).  The plaintiff’s ability to present a case is 
“[p]erhaps the most significant” consideration and depends on 
factors such as “the plaintiff’s education, literacy, prior work 
experience, and prior litigation experience.”  Id. at 501.  We 
have noted that prisoners have the ability to “proceed with an 
investigation through interrogatories, document requests, and 
requests for admissions” but are unable to conduct 
depositions, which are sometimes necessary to building a 
case.  Id. at 502-04.   
 
 Parkell’s chief complaint is that appointed counsel 
could have more aggressively pursued documents when the 
defendants resisted his requests for DOC policies and prison 
log books.  But Parkell did file motions to compel, along with 
copious discovery requests, which demonstrated a 
considerable ability to pursue discovery.  His discovery 
efforts were at times unsuccessful, and an appointed attorney 
may well have done better.  But that could be said of nearly 
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any pro se case and does not, on its own, lead us to believe 
that the District Court abused its discretion.     
 
 Parkell also cites the complexity of the case and the 
centrality of credibility determinations as grounds to appoint 
counsel.  But the core legal issues in this case — deliberate 
indifference and the reasonableness of searches — are not so 
complex that a pro se litigant would be altogether unable to 
grasp them.  Further, Parkell had significant litigation 
experience, and his filings (including significant motion 
practice) in the District Court were coherent and 
demonstrative of both literacy and basic knowledge of the 
mechanics of litigation.  Witness credibility is indeed central 
to the case, but that suggests a need for appointed counsel 
during trial, not at the summary judgment phase, where 
credibility determinations are not made.   
 
 The District Court, therefore, acted within the bounds 
of its broad discretion to deny Parkell appointed counsel.   
 
V. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The 
judgment will be reversed as to Parkell’s claim against the 
State Defendants for prospective injunctive relief under the 
Fourth Amendment, which will be remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In 
all other respects, the judgment will be affirmed.  
 
